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Cognition and Hearsay: A Response to
Professor Friedman
by
CRAIG R. CALLEN*
Professor Friedman makes a provocative case for doing away
with specific hearsay rules in civil cases and for admitting what he
might call non-testimonial statements in criminal cases. I use the
term "hearsay rules" to refer not only to the rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay that is not within an exception, but to the
exceptions themselves. Space constraints force me to concentrate on
the area of our greatest disagreement. There are many points in his
paper on which we do agree, several of which he notes in that paper.'
Although Professor Friedman rightly points out that some
arguments used to defend hearsay doctrine are dubious, I think that
he is wrong to conclude that there can be no sound basis for the
doctrine. While I do not defend the current system of hearsay rules,
word-for-word, I will discuss some substantial weaknesses in his
argument. I focus primarily on a cognitive problem for jurors that he
overlooks, or at least minimizes. A good deal of research in cognitive
science, psychology, and linguistics shows that the problem is, at the
least, more difficult than he seems to appreciate. His analogy
comparing human communication, mechanical readings, and animal
behavior is particularly misleading. In order to explain how this
cognitive problem relates to evidence rules, I must first briefly discuss
a more basic issue: why the empirical reality of human decision-
making strongly suggests that the practice of excluding some possibly
relevant evidence2 serves a useful function.
* Professor, Mississippi College School of Law. Thanks to Delicia Bryant, William
Page, Eleanor Swift, Peter Tillers, and Claire Williams for their advice on this piece.
1. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and
Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 552, 557 (1998). I agree that courts and
commentators should analyze the utility of hearsay evidence in deciding whether to admit
it. See Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REv. 43, 63-65
(1994).
2. See David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HoUs. L. REv. 1, 3
(1997) (The definition of relevant evidence in the Federal Rules is "impossibly broad if
taken literally. It can be read to include everything a lawyer would ever conceivably
offer .... ).
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1. Constraints on Cognitive Capacity and Constraints on
Evidence
It is not unusual to see arguments that fact-finders will tend to
make better decisions if the quantum of evidence to which they have
access increases. While that proposition is true in a very general,
abstract sense, one aspect of the reality of human cognition shows
that the generalization could be very misleading in any number of
particular cases.
Human ability to consider and process a mass of data at any one
time is limited.3 Our limited mental workspace requires us to use
strategies to identify critical data to help us use our limited decision-
making resources efficiently. While there are all sorts of interesting
examples of the use of strategies to guide the use of resources,
consider whether you can multiply 327 times 429 in your head. Those
who are able to do it derive their ability from the use of strategies or
tricks learned from experience.' As for the use of strategies to
identify critical data, experts in problem-solving disciplines are
primarily distinguishable from laypeople in the way they select data
rather than the amount of data they consider.5 Limitations on human
beings' mental workspace pose special problems when they (the
human beings) must act as jurors in a typical trial and become passive
decision-makers about facts without powers to call witnesses, or
question them.6 Jurors must rely on their experience in extra-judicial
decision-making in an unfamiliar context. They necessarily receive
less information about questions of fact than they would have in their
everyday lives. Processes unfamiliar to them shape the information
they do receive. The generation of evidence is party-driven, and the
parties often have incentives to present evidence in a form that is not
the easiest one for the jury to evaluate.7 For example, adversaries
have incentives to try to over-prove certain points, either to attempt
to mislead the jury with cumulative evidence, or to impress clients
with the thoroughness of their efforts.' They may prefer not to offer
3. See Herbert A. Simon & William G. Chase, The Mind's Eye in Chess, in MODELS
OF THOUGHT 404, 413-15 (Herbert A. Simon ed., 1979).
4. E.g., James J. Staszewski, Skilled Memory and Expert Mental Calculation. in THE
NATURE OF EXPERTISE 71, 92-125 (Michelene T.H. Chi et al. eds., 1988).
5. See Callen, supra note 1, at 57.
6. I have talked elsewhere about the application of the hearsay rules in bench trials.
See Craig R. Callen, Inference from the Secondary Evidence of Ordinary Witnesses and
Scientific Experts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW
TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 37, 39-40 (J. F. Nijboer & J. M.
Reintjes, eds., 1996).
7. See MIRJAN L. DAMA&KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 89, 92 (1997).
8. See e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 871 (2d ed.
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other evidence, such as evidence about the circumstances in which a
statement was made, because they fear its effect on the jury. 9
H. Cognition and Extrajudicial Statements
The need to limit consumption of valuable resources in
litigation, and the obligations and limitations of lay jurors, oblige us
to attend to the everyday strategies humans use when we design fact-
finding processes, particularly those relating to spoken, written, or
physical communications. Extra-judicial communication relies on
one fairly well-identified strategy for understanding communications
in context, which is useful in considering the difficulties passive lay
fact-finders might have in evaluating hearsay. That strategy is
outlined in a set of conventions, known as Grice's maxims.1" Those
maxims model a strategy for co-operation that enables the
communicator to convey, and the hearer to comprehend, a great deal
of information with very little effort. (There is some correspondence
between individual maxims and Morgan's hearsay dangers, but the
analyses do diverge.)"
To show how the maxims work, let me use the following example
involving my friend Sean Doran, who is Irish. Suppose I said to him,
"We have a chance to see some great hurlers Sunday." The first
maxim is that the speaker should be neither more nor less
informative than necessary. Here, I would be understood to imply to
Sean that one can see hurlers Sunday-otherwise the reference to a
chance would be a silly reference to a statistical possibility. The
second is that the utterance should relate to the purpose of the
parties to the communication, so that the reference to seeing hurlers
should refer to something we are interested in doing. The third is
that the speaker should be orderly, brief and clear. The words might,
for instance, briefly convey the availability of hurlers and the
possibility, but not certainty, that we will see them. The final maxim
is that I should try to make my contribution true. I would usually
have no reason to make the statement if seeing hurlers were
impossible. As far as I am aware (and if I can say it without
provoking a long discussion of Daubert) the theory is generally
accepted in a number of disciplines, testable and confirmed by
empirical research.
1992) (citing United States v. Reeves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1576-79 (E.D. Ky. 1986));
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
By Heuristics, 15 L. & SoC'Y REV. 123, 136-137 (1980).
9. See Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence
Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 923-24 (1992).
10. See H. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WoRDs 26-27 (1989).
11. See Callen, supra note 1, at 76.
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Well, then, what would my utterance "We have a chance to see
some great hurlers Sunday," have meant? I might well make such a
statement (i) if I wanted Sean to believe that the pitchers (or hurlers)
in the Giants-Padres game Sunday are good, (ii) if my tone were
ironic, and I wanted him to believe that the pitchers would be bad,
(iii) if I wished to impress Sean with knowledge of National League
pitchers, or (iv) if I wanted Sean to infer that there would be a
contest in that famous Irish sport, hurling. There are other
possibilities as well. Note that, as passive observers, you would not
really have a good basis on which to decide what the statement meant
on the information you have. Professor Friedman seems to say that
my statement is simply a trace unlikely to have been left unless it
were true. 2 That argument mistakes the process of communication,
because you don't know what circumstances would make the
statement true.
If you had further information, namely that Sean and I sent e-
mail to each other about the baseball games on the weekend of this
conference, you would probably conclude it was likely that I was
talking about baseball rather than hurling, and likely that I was trying
to make a point about the weekend's pitchers. If you had
information about my tone of voice, you would probably know
whether I was being ironic. In neither case would you know the basis
for my conclusions about pitchers, which, given that I seldom pay
much attention to the National League, would be very shaky.
The hearsay rules give parties incentives to supply jurors with
information they need to evaluate whether they should rely on their
extra-judicial strategies to evaluate out-of-court communications. 3
In addition, they provide a minimal check for whether the likely
impact of the evidence warrants the effort to evaluate it. The rules
exclude some 4 out-of-court statements unless the proffering parties
12. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 556.
13. While I focus here on cognitive science, linguistics and psychology, see infra at
note 21, I should say that the argument that the hearsay rules perform a necessary
evidence-forcing function can be supported any number of ways. Examples are the best
evidence theory arguments of Professors Nance and Seigel, (Dale A. Nance, The Best
Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 263-70 (1988); Seigel, supra note 9), Professor
Swift's foundation-facts theory (Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1339 (1987)), or the arguments about foundation facts and corroboration
that Professors Nesson and Benkler make in regard to the confrontation clause (Charles
R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and
Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149 (1995)).
14. Professor Friedman believes that the hearsay rules exclude a significant amount
of evidence with substantial probative value. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 557. Given
the flexibility of, for example, the residual exceptions in Rule 807, this seems extremely
doubtful. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has it been Abolished De
Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 514-17 (1992) (residual exceptions);
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produce the evidence necessary to satisfy an exception, which is
information about the context in which the statement was made, or
foundation facts. Professor Friedman seems to argue that testimonial
statements in criminal cases should be suspect because of the context
in which they arise.15 He argues, in another part of the paper, that
insisting on foundation facts for the admission of other sorts of
hearsay would be contrary to the goal of truth determination.16 Yet,
even in the case of non-testimonial hearsay, fact-finders may have no
reason to know the speaker's message without information about the
context.
Professor Friedman believes that we can rely on the adversary
system for production of information about context. 7 Parties,
however, may prefer to offer hearsay rather than offering live
testimony. Sociolinguistics tells us that the use of reports of speech in
ordinary conversation is a matter of creative narrative choice rather
than necessity. The reporter uses the report to cast herself as a mere
observer, in the process both paraphrasing and characterizing the
speaker's statements, and concealing her own evaluative role. 8
Doing so encourages the listener (or by analogy, the juror) to identify
with the witness, and allows the witness or party to avoid personal
responsibility for her utterance and yet to add the support of
authority to her message.19
That point highlights the thinness of Professor Friedman's
analogy between human speech, on the one hand, and information
obtained from extra-judicial observations of animals or
thermometers, on the other. It is fair, I think, to say that few jurors
are ever likely to personally identify with a thermometer, or to
see also Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76
MINN. L. REV. 797, 801 (1992) ("The hearsay rule today is more a rule of admission than
exclusion."). Professor Friedman also argues that the residual exception gives the fact-
finder too much discretion (Friedman, supra note 1, at 551) which seems anomalous since
the rule that he would likely use instead of the hearsay rules, Rule 403, is one under which
trial judges are given "extreme" deference. See David P. Leonard, Minimal Probative
Value and the Failure of Good Sense, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 89, 97 (1997). Finally, he argues
that the hearsay exceptions are gratuitously complex. Friedman, supra note 1 at 551. It is
likely, however, that judicial decisions about hearsay under 403 would be at least as
complex, and possibly more so. See, e.g., Christopher B. Mueller, Post Modern Hearsay
Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367, 397 (1992); Siegel, supra
note 9, at 914.
15. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 561.
16. See id. at (note 24).
17. See id.
18. See DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING VOICES: REPETITION, DIALOGUE AND
IMAGERY IN CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE 104,109,125 (1989).
19. See TANNEN, supra note 18, at 104; see also Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays:
A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog
Solution. 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 900 (1994).
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identify strongly with a witness testifying about one. Nor, with
Grice's maxims in mind, is a bloodhound likely to engage in irony.
Conclusion
Professor Friedman justifiably criticizes the psychology
underlying some of the older exceptions, such as the dying
declaration exception." While there were flaws in that earlier
psychology, it does not follow that there is no good psychological
reason to be cautious about the admission of hearsay evidence. In
fact, psychology and other fields give us some reason to think that
hearsay presents special inferential problems that may warrant
admissibility rules. Professor Friedman's paper is interesting and
provocative, but his attempt to argue that hearsay is a form of trace
evidence" misses much about human communication.
20. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 552. He also relies on some experiments
purporting to show that jurors undervalue hearsay. See id. at 555. I do not think these
studies strengthen his argument very much. First, setting a "true value" for evidence is
extraordinarily difficult, and may be impossible. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate
Fallacy Reconsidered:Descriptive, Normative and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SCI. 1 (1996). It may be that both the mock jurors in the studies and those who
stipulated the (greater) "true value" overvalued the hearsay in question. In addition, the
studies rely on exactly the sort of judgments about trustworthiness that he criticizes in
conventional doctrine-still arguing that the mock jurors were wrong and that the experts
know the true value of evidence. Finally, one of the studies reported that the mock jurors
believed that hearsay is dubious evidence and should be excluded. See Peter Miene et al.,
Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683,
697-98 (1992). That undermines the idea that any hearsay prohibition must rest on elitist
distrust of jurors, or of old fashioned "cracker barrel" psychology. See Friedman, supra
note 1, at 552.
21. Professor Friedman correctly notes that cognitive psychologists use the term
"memory traces" to refer to the changes in the brain that represent memories. See
Friedman, supra note 1, at 556. The use of the term "trace" might have led him to
conclude that psychologists regard those changes, engrams, much as a forensic expert
might think of physical traces that events or conditions may leave, such as impressions in
a photograph. That conclusion would be an error. Psychologists believe that human
memories are not literal recordings of events. Instead, humans integrate whatever
information they derive from new experiences by new information to older knowledge or
belief, in terms of the new information's meaning to them as individuals. See, e.g., Robert
A. Bjork, Memory and Metamemory Considerations in the Training of Human Beings, in
METACOGNITION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING 185, 187 (Janet Metcalfe & Arthur P.
Shimanmura eds., 1994). Retrieval of information from memory in order to make a
statement may be "more reconstructive than literal" and may depend on a number of
factors, including environment and personal mood. See id. at 187-88. So the relationship
between events and physical traces is less complicated than that between events and
reports of memory-particularly so in light of problems with statements such as possible
irony, insincerity or ambiguity.
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